[Igor Böhm via 9lab.org]
“Intelligence [agencies] are very flawed institutions: they’re highly ideological, they’re fanatic, they’re racist, and as a result the information that comes through them is usually grossly distorted.” — Noam Chomsky 1
In the early morning hours, a day prior to the Taylor Swift opening concert in Vienna, guarded by an array of road blocks, over 40 law enforcement officers, including the tier one tactical unit COBRA 2, a bomb squad, 3 and a robot dog 4, carried out a raid, transmuting the small rural industrial town of Ternitz, Austria, into a state of emergency that prevailed for hours, as an evacuation order 2 targeting 60 households and a retirement home has been issued 5.
The whole event was shrouded in mystery as a news blackout was imposed for the duration of the operation, prompting uninformed speculations, ranging from murder accusations to a potential terrorist bombing. 3 Ultimately, law enforcement officials conceded that the aim of the operation was to arrest 19-year-old Austrian Beran A., living together with his parents, who were on holidays at the time of the raid. 6 With the exception of Wolfgang Aigner, who lives next door, and described the family as “neighbours you could only wish for” in an interview, no one was willing to comment revealing their name in public. 3
At the first press conference, 24 hours before the initial concert, Franz Ruf, public security director at Austria’s interior ministry, announced that the arrested 19-year-old Austrian citizen had recently pledged allegiance to the Islamic State online, and was accused of plotting a terrorist attack focusing on the Eras Tour as a potential target. 7 Whilst emphasizing that the threat has been neutralised, 8 an increase in security measures aimed at further safeguarding Swift’s concerts was announced, as an elevated abstract threat remained. 7 Despite these pronouncements by law enforcement officials, the organizer, Barracuda Music, decided to cancel all three concerts. 9 10
In the wake of the cancellations, interior minister Gerhard Karner emphasised that the organiser opted to call off the concerts, not the authorities. He then went on to point out that in close collaboration with foreign security agencies, law enforcement “did everything they could to ensure the safety of those events”. Alluding, for the first time, to the fact that a foreign intelligence service has been involved in the matter. 9 While these statements indicate that Karner doesn’t believe security concerns warranted the cancellations, he promptly adduced that the dangers emanating from Islamic extremism after Hamas’ attack on Israel have increased significantly, with large-scale concerts being preferred targets of Islamist terrorists. Austria is no exception, hence he acknowledged the drastic step taken by the organiser to cancel all three concerts scheduled to take place in the Ernst Happel Stadium in Vienna. 11
Following the pronouncements of interior minister Karner, Austrian chancellor Karl Nehammer took advantage of the limelight by announcing a separate press conference on short notice for Thursday afternoon. 12 At the crescendo of his address, he stated that “spreading fear and sowing hatred between population groups and religions is a key dimension of Islamist terror”, 13 suggesting that one of his favourite foes responsible for poisoning society, “political Islam”, 14 would be the next, albeit renewed, ideological movement in his election campaign’s crosshairs.
However, contrary to interior minister Karner, chancellor Nehammer asserted that the cancellation of the events was “unavoidable”, lauding the organisers for acting responsibly, as “safety is of utmost concern”. He justified this claim by stating that there have been “concrete and detailed plans to create a bloodbath”, according to a confession by the suspect, in which he allegedly professed his intent to carry out a “suicide attack”. 13 According to Nehammer, the fact that a “bloodbath” was averted, confirms the successful reorganization of the Directorate of State Security and Intelligence in collaboration with the Army Intelligence Office, 13 put in place under his aegis. 15 He also reiterated the “good cooperation with other partner services”, that is foreign intelligence agencies, enabling a timely response to warnings that have been issued. 13 U.S. ambassador to Austria, Victoria Kennedy, chimed in as well on X/Twitter, lauding “the hard work of the Austrian authorities” by acknowledging that “it was a very tough decision, but safety is paramount”. 16
Chancellor Nehammer seized the opportunity to repeat his wildly exaggerated account delivered during an earlier press conference 12 in one of Austrias main television news broadcasts that evening. 17 He skillfully exploited the situation as a focusing event, reminding the public of terrorism by recalling the Paris, Manchester, and Moskau attacks in connection with Islam and Muslims, thereby priming Austrians to think about Islam in terms of terror. To confront the renewed threat of Islamic terror, Nehammer called for vastly extended intelligence and surveillance capabilities in conjunction with a broadening of Austrias ties to foreign intelligence services as a means to more effectively defend democracy. According to Nehammer, “combating political Islam as religiously motivated extremism requires the utmost seriousness and determination”, therefore our law enforcement and intelligence agencies must be equipped “with the necessary resources” to intercept and target encrypted internet communication such as Signal, WhatsApp, or Telegram. 18 17
After the initial media blitz and frenzy 19, prompting reports and articles in The New York Times 7, Le Monde 20, BBC 21, CNN 22, and other prominent international outlets, Austrian media struggled to piece together the details of the “bloodbath” that has supposedly been averted. Initially, two aspects emerged, complicating the official narrative of the Taylor Swift concert being “a high-profile soft target which, if successfully attacked, would result in massive civilian casualties while generating worldwide publicity”, a “plot [that according to counterterrorism analysts] fits ISIS-K’s modus operandi perfectly”. 7
First, the timeline 23 of events leading up to the arrest of Beran A. caused confusion, as law enforcement officials and politicians refused to reveal when and from which foreign partner intelligence service the decisive tip emanated from 24. As the media was trying to make sense of the situation, 25 this lack of basic information about uncontroversial facts resulted in reports portraying conflicting timelines of events, initiating incensed speculation and scepticism on social media. So much so that the cooperation of the Austrian Intelligence Services felt obliged to issue a joint public statement dismissing the by then widely reported claim that they knew about the terror plot 14 days in advance, reiterating that “in the interest of maintaining an undisturbed basis of trust, no information can be given regarding details about the cooperation with partner services […]”. 26 While the statement purports to “clarify various aspects about the thwarted terrorist attack”, 26 the only new fact it revealed was that information about the terror plot was not received 14 days prior to the concert. The public was still left in the dark about when and by whom Austrian secret service agencies were tipped off.
Second, the fact that the suspect was born and raised in a small rural town of Austria with no prior criminal record or connection to a terror group seemed challenging to reconcile with the narrative that he radicalised himself online to such a degree that he would be capable of effectively carrying out a “bloodbath” on the scale insinuated by counterterrorism analysts and echoed by chancellor Nehammer. To conceal Beran A. was Austrian, almost all articles, reports, and interviews, referred to him as a 19-year-old with Macedonian roots. While it was widely reported that the suspect admitted planning “to kill large numbers of people” using “explosives, knives, and machetes”, 11 27 28 the fact that he made these disclosures without a lawyer, was absent from initial reports. This rather significant detail only emerged days later, 27 29 30 31 long after the damage was done, and the hysterically exaggerated terror plot was deployed as a linchpin fueling the political campaign of the chancellors peoples party in the run up to the national elections; successfully tilting the campaign focus towards islamophobia coupled with an expansion of surveillance and intelligence capabilities to defend Austria from the evil scourge of Islamic terror. 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
Although the raid leading up to the arrest of Beran A. took place on a Wednesday morning, it wasn’t until Friday afternoon that he had access to a legal representative. 27 Werner Tomanek 31, his defence lawyer, immediately began to deconstruct the case, coercing officials to disclose details they refused to reveal so far; such as admitting they were informed of the alleged terror plot six days prior to the first concert, on August 2., by a partner service (i.e. foreign intelligence service). 4 The same partner service characterised Tomanek’s client as an IS-inspired “Lone Wolf”, trying to acquire a gun, but willing to resort to use knives instead if that fails. 4 His phone number, Telegram-Profile, and the fact that he called himself „Abu Dujana“ in a purportedly relevant channel, together with some photographs, were also forwarded. One of the photos was allegedly inspired by a declaration of allegiance to the Islamic State posted on Instagram by the perpetrator of the November 2. 2020 terror attack in Vienna. 44 45
Beran A.’s cell phone was located that same evening and he has been under surveillance ever since up to his arrest. 4 While Austria, in particular Vienna, is described as “a nexus of U.S. and Russian espionage”, 46 with many articles focusing on “allegations of spying for Russia”, 47 48 there is virtually no report or mention critical of the fact that U.S. intelligence agencies are spying on Austrian citizens without a warrant, and Austrian intelligence is using that information to incriminate potential suspects, as in this case.
Next, Tomanek commissioned an expert report 49 headed by weapons, ammunition and explosives expert Ingo Wieser. A renowned specialist in his field, who, on behalf of the court, investigated the explosion of the “Lucona”, that sank in the Indian Ocean in 1977, and has since provided numerous reports for the judiciary. 50 “The report concludes that, based on the material seized, it was not possible to carry out an explosive attack at the concerts,” Tomanek quoted from a preliminary draft. 50 In another interview Tomanek phrased the reports conclusion more bluntly, stating that according to the analysis of seized chemicals it wasn’t even possible to manufacture “table fireworks for a children’s carnival”, 51 starkly contradicting the claims made by the Directorate of State Security and Intelligence and the interior ministry. 52
The allegation that Beran A. was part of an “ISIS-connected group”, instantly fell apart as well, when it was revealed that the initial tip by foreign “partner services” classified him as a “Lone Wolf”, 4 and evidence to the contrary, despite rigorous attempts, could not be adduced. While a 17 and a 15 year old have also been arrested in the immediate aftermath 53 of the raid, no credible connection to the alleged terror plot could be demonstrated. 54 Not even during the 6 days of observation prior to A.s arrest, incriminating evidence suggesting he was part of some terror group could be dredged up. Another accusation that fell apart almost instantly for anyone who cared to look was that Beran A. “prepared intensively” 55 and had “concrete and detailed plans” for a terror attack. He never even reached the stadium’s vicinity prior to his arrest, 51 and, according to Der Spiegel, stated that he had no concrete plans for the attack, and wanted to strike “spontaneously”. He also said that he did not obtain “permission” from IS for the attack in advance, and that he “would have simply carried it out” without their approval. 56
The accusation that by uploading a photo to Instagram Beran A. pledged allegiance to the Islamic State was dismissed by Tomanek who pointed out that his client removed it again as he recognised it was a “stupid idea”. 51 56 While the act of uploading such content to a social media platform ought to raise some questions about his clients mental state, there is no evidence that IS was even aware of it, let alone accepted it as a credible pledge of allegiance; it is widely acknowledged according to Tomanek that in order to be approved by IS more proof of ones worth is required than an ephemeral photo on Instagram. In fact, law enforcement officials even tacitly conceded that “he did not announce his intentions in relevant IS channels on the Internet”, 27 rendering any claims of any ties to ISIS or its off shoots as well as the statement of DSN-Director Haijawi-Pirchner that “this was a network, that his agency was already aware of” as highly dubious and baseless. 11
As these details began to transpire about two weeks after the concert cancellations, indicating that the case against Beran A. is without any substance, Time Magazine 57 and the New York Times 58 published articles featuring deputy directory of the C.I.A. David S. Cohen, admitting, for the first time, that it was “the C.I.A. [that] provided intelligence to Austrian authorities that allowed them to disrupt a plot that could have killed thousands of people at a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna”. A few paragraphs further down in the same article, Cohen is quoted saying: “They were plotting to kill a huge number, tens of thousands of people at this concert, I am sure many Americans”. This is contradicted a few paragraphs later by stating that “Cohen said counterterrorism warnings do not always get a lot of attention. But the action to stop the attack in Austria, which potentially saved hundreds of lives, […] was different.” 58
It is quite revealing how Cohen goes from a plot that could have “killed thousands of people”, before concluding that counterterrorism warnings such as this “saved hundreds of lives”. 58 One is left to wonder how all these numbers can be true at the same time. In particular, Cohen being the deputy director of one of the most formidable intelligence agencies in the world, can not claim ignorance with respect to the legal proceedings of the case that is pointing to an intelligence debacle at best; a rather different unadorned conclusion than the hypothetical hyperbole he offered to the press. Another interpretation, supported by Tomanek’s statements, is that his client was not communicating with terrorists at all, but with C.I.A. agents posing as such. This tactic is not unusual, and commonly applied to the point that it is accepted uncontroversially in child pornography cases according to Tomanek. 51
Given these circumstances, it may seem surprising that the C.I.A. made these wildly exaggerated claims to the press. Considering the current U.S. election cycle and the fact that a “second Trump term [is] likely to bring new friction with spy agencies” as “Trump is committed to returning the intelligence community to its proper constitutional and statutory limits”, 59 one interpretation could be that it is in the interest of the C.I.A. to ensure its image as an agency that is protecting its citizens domestically and abroad is propped up, brushing aside evidence to the contrary to distract from the actual devastating record.
The C.I.A.s propaganda campaign is also likely to serve as cover for another gaffe the agency is responsible for, following the same familiar pattern of furnishing inconsequential information to Austrian intelligence services about two teenagers, 14, 17, and a 20 year old young adult, in the run up to the 2023 Pride in Vienna. They were arrested by the same COBRA task force in a commando raid shortly before the event, accused of being members of a terror organisation, ensuing the usual orthodox media barrage. 60 61 “The investigations that have been ongoing since then have apparently stalled”, 62 waiting for the evaluation of Telegram chats by the 17 year old via Ukrainian authorities that have, a year later, turned up nothing. The 14 year old was further accused of planning to commit terrorist acts as instructions of how to build a bomb were found on his cell phone. The fact that those instructions were in English that the 14-year old couldn’t comprehend given his English skills didn’t seem to bother the authorities. All three had to be released after a few days as the presented evidence was utterly unsubstantial and unconvincing. 63 It seems that a similar fate—that is, having to wait, albeit behind bars, until Telegram chats are assessed in the absence of any other incriminating evidence—awaits Beran A. and his lawyer. 64
These events have a disturbing familiarity with terror prosecutions enacted by the U.S. between September 11, 2001 and 2010. During that time frame the FBI “relied heavily on informants to entrap [a large number] of young, often […] Muslim men and send them to prison, […] producing scores of high-profile convictions each year for terror plots that never would have taken place if the [agency] had not hatched them” by “[preying] on mentally [disturbed] men with little capacity to resist their provocations.” 65 66 Despite intensive U.S. media and news coverage of these prosecutions, “the role of FBI agents in ginning up terror plots and inflating the threat of groups like ISIS, were rarely mentioned in reporting of the trials of hapless young Muslim men.” 65 Just like the U.S. government was exaggerating the presence of Al Qaeda and ISIS inside America by engineering terror plots, the Austrian government, endorsed by the CIA, is implementing analogous tactics to leave the public “with the impression that [terror] cells [are] gestating […] across the country […] to support the most reactionary policies,” 65 casting the current administration as tough on terror in the wake of the current election cycle.
Having reviewed the record of the Taylor Swift concert cancellation incident, it only confirms the conclusion that ought to be familiar to anyone that has treated similar events with the appropriate amount of skepticism, namely that “intelligence [agencies] are very flawed institutions: they’re highly ideological, they’re fanatic, they’re racist, and as a result the information that comes through them is usually grossly distorted.” 1
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